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Abstract
In this study we explored the determinants of the women’s labour supply and we attempted to identify the sharing rules for 
married couples. The analysis relied on data derived by the Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) in 2012–2013. 
The study considered the housework contributed by both spouses and we also included the wife’s disability status as a dis-
tribution factor. Moreover, we estimated the sharing rules accounting for female non-participation in the labour market. The 
household collective model was preferred over the unitary model as the results supported that changes on wages, non-labour 
income, age, education, number of children, and disability as a distribution factor affect the bargaining power and the share 
of spouses. The findings showed that for a one percent increase on female’s daily wage rate, her share on full income was 
increased by 1320 Iraqi Dinar (ID) corresponding to $1.12, while reached 1470 ID ($1.25) when the domestic labour was 
considered. Similarly, increases on the male’s wage increased her share by 630 ID ($0.50), while increases of 1 ID in the 
non-labour income increased female’s share by 0.43. The estimates showed that the disabled women decreased the share by 
1275 ID ($1.08). Furthermore, the findings illustrated that considering the non-participation of the wife in the labour market, 
her share and therefore her bargaining power was lower than their earner counterparts.
Keywords Collective model · Disability · Household behaviour · Labour supply · Sharing rule · Unitary model
Introduction
Household resource allocation and participation in the 
labour market have always been major topics of research 
in economics. Earlier research has developed various theo-
ries in an attempt to identify the patterns that the house-
hold members participate in the labour market and share the 
resources maximising their utilities. The first applications 
rely on the unitary model that treats the household as an 
individual who maximises her utility. The household is con-
sidered as one entity which interacts only with the outside 
world economy and society.
Chiappori (1988) proposed a household collective model, 
where it is assumed that each household member is charac-
terized by his (her) own utility function and that decisions 
result in Pareto-efficient outcomes. This specification rules 
out various forms of altruism in which each individual cares 
about the other’s utility and consumption of private goods, 
and the advantaged member can have preference that favour 
redistribution. Overall, there is no agreement at present on 
which model is appropriate and indeed it may be that dif-
ferent models are relevant in different contexts (Browning 
et al. 2006).
This study aims to answer how the spouses determine 
the household choices of labour supply and resource allo-
cation, based on individual and household characteristics 
and disability of women as a distribution factor. Disabil-
ity is a topic of major interest, especially in the case of 
Iraq, where people have been disproportionally affected by 
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violence, terrorism, and armed conflicts that were domi-
nating the country over several decades and have prevailed 
since 2003 following the Iraqi war. While those disabled 
persons belong to various kinds of religious communities 
and ethnic groups, and in all gender and age groups, they 
face common experiences of often multiple and aggravated 
forms of discrimination that deteriorate their well-being 
and hinder their right to participation in all aspects of the 
society (Makkonen 2002; Warner and Brown 2011).
It is very important to recognise that the provision of 
care for a disabled family member may compete with other 
activities, such as productive employment and schooling, 
exacerbating existing differentials in resource allocation 
(Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990). Therefore, especially due 
to poverty conditions, disabled people’s problems are 
often only met when other household members’ needs are 
acquired (Burchardt and Zaidi 2008; Cullinan and Lyons 
2015; Ozdamar and Giovanis 2016; Pitt and Rosenzweig 
1990; Tibble 2005).
The motivation of the study lies on the fact that wom-
en’s labour supply, especially in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries, is very low and the health condi-
tions and disability status may even have a stronger adverse 
impact on household resource allocation. Even though the 
women’s labour supply-participation has increased substan-
tially in the last 50 years, and especially in the developed 
countries, there are still time allocations to both household 
work and market that are highly differentiated by gender 
(Bianchi et al. 2014; Cooke and Janeen 2010; Sayer et al. 
2004). Iraq is one special case, where the men still dominate 
in the labour market in terms of wage and professional class 
(United Nations 2015).
The analysis about the ways that the domestic and house-
hold labour is shared within the household is essential for 
social and economic policy evaluation, especially in the 
Iraqi context, where we consider also the disability status of 
women. Additionally, we will explore the non-participation 
of wife in the labour market and this can be crucial about the 
effect of changes in the potential wage of non-participating 
members, providing key insights into the bargaining process. 
To the best of our knowledge there is no study so far in Iraq, 
investigating the relationship between gender, disability, and 
access to labour market, as the majority of the literature 
review examines US, British, and other European cases.
This paper is structured as follows: Second section pre-
sents an overview of the previous literature and approaches 
to labour supply modelling. Third section describes in 
details the theoretical framework and the setup of the empiri-
cal model. The next section describes the dataset used in 
the empirical work, while in the Empirical Results section 
we report the main findings and limitations of our analy-
sis. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the concluding 
remarks of the study.
Literature Review
Becker (1981) was probably the first that formalized the 
household behaviour within the extension of the neoclassical 
consumer demand models to families. Nevertheless, Samu-
elson (1956) before Becker already developed the household 
welfare function to express social indifference curves. There-
fore, considering and combining the frameworks by Samu-
elson and Becker, we assume that the household attempts to 
maximise a joint welfare function where the marginal rate of 
substitution is equal across all the pairs of goods. The uni-
tary model treats the household to behave in the same way as 
the individual does, implying that the neoclassical consumer 
theory axioms and assumptions can be applied (Vermeulen 
2002). However, neoclassical consumer theory applies only 
to individuals and not to groups. Moreover, according to the 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, group preference relations 
do not necessarily behave in the same way as those for the 
individuals and therefore they cannot be modelled in the 
same fashion (Browning and Chiappori 1998).
One of the testable restrictions of the unitary model is the 
income pooling, which is a condition where the household 
resources, including the non-labour income, labour, capital, 
and land are pooled together. Earlier literature used collec-
tive models to examine the consumption allocation and to 
test the income pooling which was rejected in the majority of 
the studies (Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Arias et al. 2004; 
Blundell at al. 2005, 2007; Bourguignon et al. 1993; Chavas 
et al. 2018; Chiappori 1988, 1992; Chiappori et al. 2002; 
Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Giovanis and Ozdamar 2018; Lun-
dberg et al. 1997).
In another study by Hendy and Sofer (2010), the intra-
household resource allocation in the married couples in 
Egypt and the plausible impact on the female labour supply 
was explored. The authors employed data from the Egyptian 
Labor Market and Panel Survey of 2006 and they tested new 
innovative distribution factors, such as the female’s contri-
bution to the total cost of the marriage (Roushdy 2004) and 
the “moakhar,” which represents the amount of the money 
that the husband must pay to his wife in the case of divorce. 
The results showed that females’ contribution to marriage 
costs influenced significantly their labour supply choices. 
Moreover, the authors suggested that females tend to spend 
their own money on the household as the estimated share 
was negative, but the sharing rule parameters were statisti-
cally nonsignificant.
Following the methodology by Chiappori (1992) and 
Rapoport et al. (2011), we considered wife’s disability sta-
tus as a distribution factor, instead of the sex ratio or rela-
tive wages and income. In particular, any exogenous vari-
able internal or external to the household that has no direct 
impact on preferences or the household budget constraint, 
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but influences the household behavior, can be defined as a 
potential distribution factor. Therefore, shifts in distribution 
factors affect the intra-household decision process on the 
distribution of the resources and the welfare of individu-
als within the households, but they do not shift its utility 
possibility frontier. In other words, these variables influ-
ence the family behaviour only through the effect on the 
intra-household decision process, but do not enter into the 
household’s budget constraint or the individual preferences. 
In our case, the working supply functions may depend on 
such distribution factors and therefore a shift on them will 
have consequences for the intra-household decisions and 
the individuals within the household (Chavas et al. 2018; 
Chiappori et al. 2002; Chiappori and Ekeland 2009). Also, 
household composition, region, and marital status are impor-
tant facto of time preferences to labour supply and leisure 
(Hiatt and Godwin 1990; Hilton 1990). The sex ratio has 
been employed by earlier studies as a distribution factor and 
is defined as the number of men divided by the number of 
women of specific age groups or the whole population. This 
is also used as a proxy to the marriage market restriction and 
is likely to influence the female labour force participation 
and propensity of divorce (Chiappori 1992). Thus, a nega-
tive sign will imply a higher number of men and reduced 
number of working hours for women or lower probability 
of female participation in the labour market.
One issue is how convincible can be the disability to 
serve as a potential distribution factor. Our argument lies on 
the fact that as in the case of education differences between 
household members used as a distribution factor, it does 
not affect directly the preferences, but influences the house-
hold allocation decisions. Thus, we claim that disability is 
an exogenous variable, especially in the case of war and 
armed conflicts. Overall, one of the main elements of the 
distribution factor independence hypothesis (DFI) and which 
has received a lot of attention in the literature is to test the 
unitary model by the income pooling condition. One pos-
sible objection to the use of a distribution factor based on the 
individual’s disability status level is that does not enter pref-
erences, whereas disability can be a preference factor. In this 
study we consider the hours spent in the household-domestic 
production. So, non-disabled wives with lower disability lev-
els will spend more hours in the labour market and house-
hold chores than their disabled counterparts. This implies 
a higher relative bargaining and decision power for the 
wife allowing her to claim a larger share of the non-labour 
income (Browning et al. 2006; Crespo 2009). In a study by 
Butikofer et al. (2011) the findings suggested that the older 
wives consumed between 30 and 42% of total household 
expenditures, however, these shares increased dramatically 
when the husband’s health was poorer. Nevertheless, in this 
study we explored the resource allocation considering the 
wife’s disability and compared the household resource allo-
cations between the disabled and non-disabled wives.
So far the choice of the variables entering the Pareto 
weight is mostly based on an informal justification for the 
inclusion of one or another variable. However, the aim of the 
study is not to test the collective versus the unitary model, 
as the previous studies show that the sharing rule always 
depends on labour supply and total expenditure through the 
budget constraint and the Pareto weight. Also, if the sharing 
rule depends on the distribution factors, it does not imply 
a preference of the one model over the other, but it only 
indicates whether demand depends on distribution factors. 
From the point of view of policy, previous studies used the 
income share, considering it is an important distribution fac-
tor, because relevant policies and reforms may alter or affect 
this variable. Therefore, following this logic, our aim is to 
examine the female disability status. Recovering the sharing 
rules based on this factor, relevant policies including dis-
ability benefits and integration in labour market and other 
social aspects of life for women can be implemented. In this 
case we can conceive a model where resources are pooled, 
but allocation of expenditures and thus the sharing rule 
depend also on other distribution factors besides income. 
So far we concluded that the choice of variables entering 
Pareto weight, the structure of the model and whether this 
is unitary or collective and the justification of the distribu-
tion factor depends on different contexts. Since disability is 
a common characteristic of the Iraqi society, we chose the 
female disability as a distribution factor which is useful to 
recover the sharing rules and investigate some features of the 
intra-household decision process on labour supply. Further-
more, even though the disability can also affect preferences, 
our main aim in this study is to recover the sharing rules 
and to compare them between disabled wives and their non-
disabled counterparts.
Overall, the main motivation and contribution of this 
study is threefold. First, the aim was to identify conditions 
of a more general class of household production functions, 
without pooling together leisure and household domestic 
production. Thus, we recognize that the allocation of time 
between working in the labour market, time spent on house-
hold work, or production, and leisure may vary. In particular, 
we found that the presence of young children reduces the 
labour supply of women and increases the household pro-
duction time, which includes cooking, cleaning, and child 
care. However, earlier literature assumes that the house-
hold labour time is entirely leisure (Chiappori 1988, 1992; 
Chiappori et al. 2002; Fortin and Lacroix 1997). Failure to 
distinguish between leisure and household labour supply 
will most probably lead to measurement errors in terms of 
the sharing rule. The intensive household labour time may 
explain the relationship between low female labour market 
supply and a larger share of the household full income, as the 
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household production is being traded for monetary income 
with little leisure. Thus, this real leisure time differs between 
men and women and this may explain possible measurement 
errors of the bargaining power through the sharing rule.
Very few papers have attempted to analyse the household 
production within a theoretical framework and empirical 
analysis (Aronsson et al. 2001; Rapoport et al. 2011). This 
is important because the household production accounts for 
more than 50% of the labour market activity and more spe-
cifically, it constitutes from 60 to 80% of the total working 
time for women and 30–40% for men (Goldschmidt-Cler-
mont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis 1995). Therefore, an impor-
tant drawback in the earlier studies is that the estimation of 
the sharing rule depends on an unclear definition of leisure 
where in the majority of the case studies, household labour 
time is defined as leisure.
Second, the aim was to extend the model by Rapoport 
et al. (2011) considering and identifying also men’s house-
work function. This is important because given the house-
hold composition, wages, education, and age, the household 
labour time of men may significantly differ. In particular, 
we found that husbands with very young children increased 
their household labour time, while those with older children 
were more likely to spend more time in the labour market. 
Furthermore, including the housework labour time, the shar-
ing rule may considerably increase, especially in the case 
of wives. Thus, pooling together the household labour time 
with leisure may lead to biased estimates of the sharing rule.
Third, we included the female non-participation in the 
labour market and their disability status as a distribution 
factor, given the gender gap in terms of employment, wages, 
and other social aspects. The motivation of exploring the 
wife’s disability status lies on the fact that women, espe-
cially with psycho-social disabilities, are at particular risk of 
exploitation, sexual harassment, and abuse (USAID 2014). 
According to a report of United Nations (UN), a double 
discrimination against women with disabilities is reported 
which is linked to their special living condition (United 
Nations 2016). In particular, the double discrimination refers 
to the women’s imprisonment by both disability and society 
norms, beliefs, and traditions about their participation in the 
labour market and the gender role attitudes. These reports 
reveal that disabled men are still generally more likely to 
have more educational opportunities and obtain better jobs 
compared to women with disabilities.
Disabled women are further burdened by lack of freedom 
resulting from gender, societal and traditional beliefs-values, 
and expectations, and thus face more difficulties accessing 
basic services, completing education and finding employ-
ment. Additionally, disabled women are far less aware about 
their rights and how to claim them. Indeed, earlier studies 
found that women with disabilities have a particular dis-
advantage in relation to their access to education, which is 
derived by the society’s perception that women’s education 
is not valued and is not considered to be a priority (UNICEF 
2010). Thus, the main motivation of the study is that we 
aim to explore the impact of disability status of women, 
since they are limited by both societal norms and their liv-
ing conditions. However, earlier studies mainly explored 
the western countries, while the interest in the Iraqi case is 
mainly limited. The study by Jones et al. (2006) showed that 
both disabled and non-disabled men in UK earned more than 
even non-disabled women on average. This is expected to be 
also the case in the Iraqi society, and for this reason we also 
include the female non-participation in the labour market to 
highlight the discrepancies.
Conceptual Framework and Research 
Methodology
One of the major causes of disability in MENA (Middle East 
and North Africa) region is the conflicts, including examples 
from Algeria, Iraq, and West Bank and Gaza. In addition to 
the direct effect of violence, contending demands on scarce 
human and financial resources nations result in decreasing 
prevention mechanisms, which lead to conditions that exac-
erbate disabilities. Iraq has also suffered the consequences 
of three major wars, resulting in the poorest health outcomes 
in the region. As a result, the prevalence of physical dis-
abilities and chronic mental problems among the working 
age population in Iraq has increased dramatically. Previous 
studies show that people with disabilities, experience worse 
educational and labour market outcomes and are more likely 
to be poor than the non-disabled persons (Parodi and Sciulli 
2008; Zaidi and Burchardt 2005). A study by OECD (2009) 
covering 21 upper-middle and high-income countries shows 
higher poverty rates among working-age people with dis-
abilities than among working-age people without disability 
in all but three countries: Norway, Slovakia, and Sweden.
Another important fact is that none of the countries has 
yet introduced specific legislation or enforced rules that 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. There are 
two main models aim to reduce inequalities in the labour 
market. The first relies on anti-discrimination legislation and 
laws, including monitoring, and the concept of corporate 
social responsibility to encourage equality in the employers’ 
recruitment and hiring processes.
The second relies on the hiring quotas imposed by the 
government accompanied with the possibility of severe pen-
alties in cases of breaching. Nevertheless, the majority of 
these countries have not implemented these regulations and 
even they have been signed or passed, these are not applied 
in reality. From 20 MENA, countries 13 have not signed the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities (CRPD) including Iraq. This defines 
Journal of Family and Economic Issues 
1 3
as “persons with disabilities those with long-term physical, 
mental, and intellectual impairments which in interaction 
with various barriers may hinder their full and effective par-
ticipation in society on an equal basis with others” (United 
Nations 2007, p. 4). This Protocol allows people with dis-
abilities to bring complaints to the Committee on the Rights 
of People with Disabilities in cases where their rights have 
been violated. Additional CRPD protocols have been also 
ignored in MENA countries.
The lack of anti-discrimination legislation in these coun-
tries that could reinforce obligations to accommodate per-
sons with disabilities, for example in the labour market, 
is another reason for the weak effectiveness of the quota 
systems and disability benefits in place (Rioux and Pinto 
2014). The evidence provided by earlier studies shows that 
the intra-household collective framework is proper as it 
predicts that disabled wives will spend less time on labour 
market than their non-disabled counterparts (Gallipoli and 
Turner 2009). Moreover, studies show that the intra-house-
hold model on allocation time and labour supply choices is 
relevant for policy makers, because the household labour 
supply and demand both depend on who in the household 
is subsidied or taxed. Thus, the motivation of this study is 
to explore the resource household allocation considering 
female disability as a distribution factor, and since many 
policies and reforms are missing from these countries, rel-
evant implementation and government intervention can alter 
the disability variable and the sharing rule.
The model used in the empirical work relied on the 
assumption that the household decisions are Pareto-efficient 
(Apps and Rees 1988; Bourguignon et al. 2009; Browning 
et al. 1994; Chiappori 1988, 1992). In addition, we included 
age and education level as individual characteristics and the 
female disability as a distribution factor. We assumed that 
the spouses had individual preferences over the consumption 
of an aggregate market good c, leisure time l and a domestic-
produced good q, which included cooking, cleaning, child-
care, and others. The production function for the domestic 
good-chore q, using the working hours by female and male 
denoted respectively by tf and tm was:
The household maximised the following weighted utili-
tarian household welfare function:
z was a vector of individual and household character-
istics, including age, education, disability, the number 
of children and whether the area-location was urban or 
rural. The Pareto weight component µ represented the 
importance of the couple in the intra-household collective 
(1)q = f
(
tf , tm
)
(2)
max
lf ,lm,Cf ,Cm,qf ,qm
휇
[
Uf
(
lf ,Cf , qf ;퐳
)]
+ (1 − 휇)
[
Um
(
lm,Cm, qm;퐳
)]
decision process. Under the collective setting µ was a func-
tion that captured the bargaining power of individuals con-
tained in [0,1] and it was continuously differentiable in all 
its arguments and variables that affected each member’s 
bargaining power expressed as µ = µ(wf, wm, y, s1,…..,sR). 
Therefore, µ was a function of wages, non-labour income 
and the vector s that included the distribution factors. The 
maximisation function (2) was subject to the following 
constraints:
Relation (3) was the budget constraint, w was the wage 
for i = m,f indicating male and female respectively, C was 
the consumption and y was the household non-labour 
income, including assets, transfers and savings. The term 
pqq −
∑
i=f ,m
witi was the profit function, tf and tm were the 
hours devoted to the household production for female and 
male respectively. The term witi represented the cost of the 
household chore-production, which was expressed as the 
opportunity cost or time loss that could have been used in 
the labour market.
In the time constraint (4) we defined hi = ti + li, where 
ti was the time use on household domestic production, li 
indicated the leisure, and the labour supply was repre-
sented by Li and consequently the total time was denoted 
by T. The vector s only appeared in the Pareto weight, 
affecting the bargaining power or position of the adult 
members, but not their preferences or the household 
budget constraint (Donni and Moreau 2007; Bourguig-
non et al. 2009). More details and information about the 
solution of the model can be made upon request. Follow-
ing Chiappori et al. (2002) and other studies (Donni and 
Moreau 2007; Bourguignon et al. 2009; Rapoport et al. 
2011) we used a semi-logarithmic specification, for the 
female and male labour supply equations as:
In the structural system (5) and (6) the hl denoted the 
working hours per day for male and female represented by 
m and f respectively, w, y and s denoted respectively the 
wage, non-labour income and the distributional factors, 
while z was defined as in (2). To estimate and test a col-
lective model of labour supply we must specify the proper 
function form for the individual labour supply functions. 
The parameterisation of the semi-logarithmic system (5) 
(3)
∑
i=f ,m
Ci =
∑
i=f ,m
Liwi + y + pqq −
∑
i=f ,m
witi
(4)Ti = hi + Li
(5)
hlf = a0 + a1 lnwf + a2 lnwm + a3 lnwf lnwm + a4y + a5s + a
�
퐳
(6)
hlm = b0 + b1 lnwf + b2 lnwm + b3 lnwf lnwm + b4y + b5s + b
�
퐳
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and (6) is convenient as it satisfies a number of desirable 
properties. First, in its unrestricted form it does not a pri-
ori impose all the restrictions of the model and therefore, 
allows them to be tested. Also, the collective restrictions 
of the model do not impose unrealistic constraints under 
this functional form and it becomes easier to recover the 
sharing rule. Another important advantage of the logarith-
mic form is that wage rates reflect a more realistic behav-
iour than the linear terms as it allows the effect of the wage 
on the labour supply to decrease with the hours of work, 
which is the case that labour supply is upward sloping.
However, one limitation of the semi-logarithmic specifi-
cation is that some restrictions of the unitary model consist-
ent with this system may impose unrealistic labour supply 
behaviour and others do not, and thus, these cannot be tested. 
Nevertheless, we rely on previous studies, discussed in the 
earlier parts, where the majority has rejected the unitary 
model and have used the semi-logarithmic form. From the 
relations (5) and (6) we computed the derivatives of the 
sharing rules (7) and (8) and details can be provided upon 
request.
Thus, the extension of the model explored in this study 
was the new components that entered (7) and (8) defined 
by the tf and tm which was the time used respectively by 
the wife and husband to household chores and it was fully 
observed in our case. Therefore, we extended the model by 
Rapoport et al. (2011), including also the husband’s contri-
bution to housework. Since we had a simultaneous system 
(5) and (6), the seemingly unrelated, three stage least squares 
(3SLS) and Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) can 
be applied. GMM was preferred to 3SLS as it provides effi-
cient estimates of the parameters, accounting for the pos-
sible correlation between the error terms in the male and 
female labour supply equations. Also, GMM computes effi-
cient estimators even when the errors are heteroskedastic 
of an unknown form (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). In 
summary, we first estimated the labour supply functions 
and after taking their estimated coefficients we estimated 
the sharing rule of the model proposed by Chiappori et al. 
(2002) with non-market time treated as “pure” leisure. Then 
we re-estimated both sets of parameters, but we took into 
account the time contributed in the household-domestic 
production.
So far the analysis relied on the fact that both spouses 
participate in the labour market. We extended the 
(7)휑f =
BC
D − C
− tf =
a5(b1 + b3 lnwm)
Δwf
− tf
(8)휑m =
AD
D − C
− tm =
b5(a2 + a3 lnwf )
Δwm
− tm
econometric analysis accounting also for spouses’ labour 
market non-participation. The index for labour market par-
ticipation was:
Variables w and y are defined as previously, for male m 
and female f in household i, while lp denoted the labour 
market participation decision for j = m, f. However, in our 
case we limited the sample to husbands that always par-
ticipated in the labour market, while we considered for 
female also the possibility of non-participation. We also 
allowed for a flexible function form inserting quadratic 
terms on age. We assumed that wages do not depend on the 
characteristics of the spouse and the wage equations taking 
a standard approach of human capital were:
D denotes whether the respondent was disabled, as 
it may determine the wage depending on the disability 
and severity status, and vector z was defined as before. 
We implemented the two-step Heckman selection model 
(Heckman 1979) to predict the wages, corrected for sample 
selection and considering also wives that did not partici-
pate in the market. Since we considered only the female 
participation, the wage Eq. (10) included the age, educa-
tion level and disability status of wives, while additional 
controls in vector z included the number of children and 
the urban area. The participation equation included the 
wife’s wage rates and the household non-labour income as 
we have seen in (9), and the additional factors in vector z, 
as age, spouses’ education, the number of children, and the 
urban area. The instruments excluded from the participa-
tion equation refer to the respondent’s employment sector, 
such as whether is public, private, or self-employed; the 
geographical area, which indicates city, town, or village; 
the Gadah-district and the second order polynomial term 
of age.
The key problem observed in the wage and participa-
tion equations is that we observe the characteristics in the 
regression of wages for those who are employed, but we 
are unable to observe the equation for the whole popula-
tion. Hence, the results will tend to be biased, due to pos-
sible sample selection bias and the size of the bias would 
be mainly driven by the correlation between the errors in 
the two models; the wage and participation equation.
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Data
The analysis in this study relied on data derived from 
the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) 
over the period 2012–2013. IHSES is a household survey 
programme which aims to produce high quality data and 
improved survey methods. It was developed by the need 
to improve the statistical data at the household level which 
are required for design, analysis, implementation and 
evaluation of the social policies in developing countries. 
Additionally, the aim of the IHSES programme is to offer 
a measurement and understanding of the living conditions, 
the interaction of government spending and programmes 
along with the household behaviour and the assessment 
of these policies. The regression analysis was based on 
weights by the inverse of measurement error variance. In 
particular, the inverse variance weighting is a method that 
aggregates two or more random variables to minimise the 
variance of the weighted average. In our case, the weight 
was the inverse of the selection probability, adjusted to 
match the Gadah -district population, while our cluster 
was based on that district.
In Table 1 we present the t-statistics hypothesis tests of 
equality between the couples of the main variables used 
in the empirical work. These statistics refer to two-earner 
Table 1  Summary statistics and t-statistics for married two-earner couples in Iraq
Standard deviation within the brackets, ID denotes Iraqi Dinars, wage rates are expressed on daily basis. Time use on labour market, leisure, 
household chores, caring of children and elderly are expressed on hours per day
Variables Males Females T-statistic p-value
Panel A: spouses characteristics
 Wage (in 1000 ID) 31.119 (5.430) 27.870 (2.891) 2.409 0.0092
 Age 38.094 (0.5542) 30.322 (1.044) 7.183 0.0000
 Education
  No-certificate—illiterate 0.0477 (0.0129) 0.0183 (0.0081) 2.328 0.0206
  Elementary school 0.1764 (0.0231) 0.0772 (0.0162) 3.959 0.0001
  High school 0.1801 (0.0233) 0.1617 (0.0223) 0.554 0.5795
  University degree 0.5625 (0.0301) 0.7242 (0.0271) − 4.462 0.0000
  Postgraduate and higher education 0.0183 (0.0081) 0.0330 (0.0108) − 1.069 0.2859
 Time use on household chores 0.5989 (0.0641) 3.943 (0.1366) − 20.646 0.0000
 Time use on caring of children and elderly 0.7618 (0.1247) 2.4247 (0.1987) − 7.334 0.0000
 Time use on labour market 5.3386 (0.2669) 3.7690 (0.2536) 5.625 0.0000
 Time use on leisure 2.9008 (0.1731) 2.5371 (0.1482) 3.050 0.0025
Variables Disabled Non-disabled T-statistic p-value
Panel B: disabled characteristics
 Wage (in 1000 ID) 19.409 (1.028) 26.016 (1.352) − 2.174 0.0253
 Age 39.404 (1.218) 35.882 (0.2385) 3.156 0.0016
 Education
  No-certificate—illiterate 0.4252 (0.0533) 0.3096 (0.0108) 2.268 0.0234
  Elementary school 0.3563 (0.0516) 0.3396 (0.0111) 0.321 0.7482
  High school 0.1379 (0.0371) 0.1745 (0.0089) − 0.881 0.3783
  University degree 0.0689 (0.0273) 0.1700 (0.0088) − 2.482 0.0132
  Postgraduate and higher education 0.0060 (0.0018) 0.0214 (0.0091) − 2.322 0.0213
Time use on household chores 0.2432 (0.0880) 1.4795 (0.0432) − 2.260 0.0207
Time use on caring of children and elderly 0.2972 (0.1086) 1.3122 (0.0319) − 2.419 0.0156
Time use on labour market 4.1891 (0.4797) 6.7244 (0.1133) − 2.057 0.0374
Time use on leisure 2.8686 (0.3154) 1.4776 (0.0549) 2.411 0.0150
Panel C: household characteristics
 Non-labour income 2870.722 12,146.76 0 190,100
 Number of children 0–5 years old 0.4530 0.6860 0 2
 Number of children 6–15 years old 1.121 0.9223 0 3
 Urban area 0.4398 0.4157 0 1
 Total observations 906
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married couples, following the methodological framework 
described, while in Table 2 we reported the same statistics 
considering also the female non-participation in the labour 
market. Based on the data presented in Panel A of Table 1, 
we rejected the null hypothesis of equality between the 
spouses’ characteristics, except for the educational level 
and in particular the proportion of couples that have 
completed the high school. As it was expected husbands 
were older, earned more, and spent less time on house-
hold chores and caring of children and elderly than their 
spouses. On the other hand, husbands spent more time 
on the labour market and leisure. Also, we reported the 
summary statistics for the disabled and non-disabled, for 
both sexes, and we found significant differences regarding 
wage, age, and education attainment. In particular, disa-
bled people earn less, are older, and more likely to be illit-
erate than their non-disabled counterparts. Non-disabled 
couples are more educated, and they spend more hours on 
labour market, household chores, and caring of children 
and elderly, while we found that they spend less hours on 
leisure compared to disabled family members. This can be 
explained by the fact that healthy people devote more time 
on labour market and caring, especially when a disabled 
member is present in the household. It is very important 
for the disabled people to allocate more time to leisure 
that includes also rehabilitation activities and home care.
In Table 2 we found similar concluding remarks, but the 
time use of wives in household chores and childcare was sig-
nificantly higher compared to the findings in Table 1. More-
over, we illustrated that husbands participate in the labour 
market at 7 h per day on average, while wives’ participation 
was only 0.55. This was expected, since in Table 2 we con-
sidered also the wives who did not participate in the labour 
market and this explained also the very low wage. A remark-
able finding was that husbands spent on average more time 
on leisure when the wives work, while the inverse situation 
was observed when we considered the female non-participa-
tion in the labour market. Also, we observed that men have 
completed a higher education degree in higher proportions 
compared to women, while women presented higher pro-
portions of low educational qualifications attainment. This 
gives a first impression of the household behaviour in Iraq, 
where women spend significantly a higher portion of their 
daily time on household chores and caring for other family 
members and much less time on labour market than their 
husbands. We should mention that in 2007 the female labour 
market participation was only 18%, while males’ participate 
rate was 81% and reduced at 14% in 2011 (United Nations 
2015). Our data show that in 2012 only 21% of the women 
are working or actively seeking for job, while the respective 
percentage for men reaches 82.8%. However, this percent-
age refers to women of any kind of marital status, including 
married, single, divorced, and widows. When we consider 
Table 2  Summary statistics and 
t-statistics for married couples 
with non-female participation 
in Iraq
Standard deviation within the brackets, ID denotes Iraqi Dinars, wage rates are expressed on daily basis. 
Time use on labour market, leisure, household chores, caring of children and elderly are expressed on hours 
per day
Variables Males Females T-statistic p-value
Panel A: spouses characteristics
 Wage (in 1000 ID) 28.752 (1.347) 4.159 (0.3701) 21.018 0.0000
 Age 35.336 (0.2557) 30.819 (0.2266) 5.056 0.0000
 Education
  No-certificate—illiterate 0.2365 (0.0098) 0.3455 (0.0109) − 8.947 0.0000
  Elementary school 0.3147 (0.0107) 0.3157 (0.0108) − 0.078 0.9378
  High school 0.1903 (0.0090) 0.1541 (0.0083) 3.072 0.0022
  University degree 0.2440 (0.0099) 0.1780 (0.0088) 6.230 0.0000
  Postgraduate and higher education 0.0143 (0.0027) 0.0063 (0.0018) 2.615 0.0090
 Time use on household chores 0.2765 (0.0178) 4.0625 (0.0436) − 79.042 0.0000
 Time use on caring of children and elderly 0.5286 (0.0282) 2.2488 (0.0627) − 7.334 0.0000
 Time use on labour market 6.8977 (0.0984) 0.5397 (0.0558) 54.679 0.0000
 Time use on leisure 1.5840 (0.0512) 1.7839 (0.0543) − 6.887 0.0000
Panel B: household characteristics
 Non-labour income 3038.527 11,968.472 0 166,000
 Number of children 0–5 years old 2.016 1.451 0 4
 Number of children 6–15 years old 0.616 0.771 0 3
 Urban area 0.335 0.452 0 1
 Total observations 33,242
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only the married women then female labour supply reached 
only the 2.7%. Therefore, we find that it is also relevant to 
the policy makers’ interests to explore additionally the non-
participation of wives in the labour market.
We can derive some initial concluding remarks from the 
correlation matrix presented in Table 3. The first remark 
is that age, education, and wages are positively correlated, 
both between and within partners. Both spouses’ education 
level is positively associated with the wife’s time spent in 
the labour market. This may imply that first; more educated 
women are more likely to work additional hours resulting 
also to higher wage rates. Second, more educated husbands 
may allow or encourage their wives to actively participate 
more in the labour market. A higher wage of both partners 
is associated with higher time use to labour market and less 
time spent on household production-chores. Spouses’ wage, 
education level, and time spent on labour market and house-
hold domestic production are lower when they are disabled. 
The correlation between spouses’ age and disability status is 
negative, indicating that younger people are healthier. This 
is expected as both physical and mental health decline with 
age, at least in terms of the inability to function indepen-
dently concerning the basic activities of daily living.
Empirical Results
We estimated a two-step Heckman selection model (Heck-
man 1979) to explore the determinants of the woman’s par-
ticipation in the labour market and the wages (Table 4). The 
wife’s age and labour supply presented a non-monotonic 
relationship, illustrating an inverted U-shaped curve. Both 
partners’ education level was positively related to the prob-
ability of labour participation. Thus, wives who are highly 
educated were more likely to have access to better infor-
mation related to labour market opportunities, better skills 
and higher chances of being employed. Another factor we 
included into the estimates is the number of children and we 
showed that it was a significant determinant of the woman’s 
labour participation. More specifically, the number of chil-
dren aged 0–15 years were negatively associated with the 
probability of the women to participate in the labour market. 
The last factor we included into the analysis is a dummy var-
iable indicating whether the wife had disability. As we were 
expected, the coefficient sign was negative and significant.
Education level coefficients were positive and significant 
and their relationship with the wages was monotonic. Thus, 
more educated wives have access to better jobs and higher 
potential earnings. Disability had a significant and negative 
effect on wages earned by wives, while the number of chil-
dren and the area coefficients were insignificant. According 
to the Wald Chi square statistic and its associated p-value 
we conclude that the estimated coefficients are jointly 
significant. Regarding the Likelihood ratio of independent 
equations, we failed to accept the null hypothesis which is 
rho = 0 indicating that the Heckman estimates were preferred 
given the value of the statistic and the zero p-value.
In Table 5 we presented the GMM estimates for the 
labour supply Eqs. (5) and (6). We should notice that based 
on the theoretical framework described in the previous sec-
tion, our analysis relied only on the married couples and 
the survey we used is representative of the total population 
given the fact that the 14% of the women participated in the 
labour market in 2013, excluding the widowed, divorced, 
and single, since our theoretical framework assumes two-
earner couples. In addition, 25% of the women participate 
in the labour market were actively seeking for job, but were 
unemployed.
We observed that husband’s and wife’s wage had respec-
tively a negative and positive effect on the female’s labour 
supply, and we showed that the wife’s share was positively 
associated with increases in the husband’s wage. The conse-
quence of this increase was the wife’s labour supply reduc-
tion, since the leisure is a normal good. The coefficient of 
the non-labour income was negative, indicating that wives in 
wealthier households were more likely to reduce their time 
use in the labour market.
Both spouses were more likely to reduce the labour sup-
ply when the children are younger than 6 years old. On the 
other hand, the effect of the number of children 6–15 years 
old was positive and significant on the labour supply for 
males. The findings are consistent with earlier studies, where 
the young children had a negative impact on men’s labour 
supply, and the number of elder children had nonsignificant 
effect on women’s hours worked in the labour market (Car-
lin and Flood 1997; Lundberg 2002; Wilfred et al. 2005). 
This can be explained also by the fact that public childcare 
arrangements and policies are missing in Iraq, compared 
to Europe where childcare subsidies may affect the labour 
supply (Brewer et al. 2016; Uunk et al. 2005). The age and 
education were significant factors and increased their par-
ticipation time to labour market. This was expected as more 
educated people are more likely to participate in the labour 
market, working more hours and having higher potential 
earnings.
In the Columns (3) and (4) we reported the estimates 
when we considered additionally the time devoted to house-
hold domestic production, which included chores and child 
caring. The estimated coefficients were similar, but the effect 
of number of children 0–5 years old on the labour supply of 
women was lower. This may imply two concluding remarks: 
First, married and employed women spend more time in the 
labour market, and second, the husbands also contribute 
to child caring. About disability, the results remained the 
same for the female’s labour supply equation, and the effect 
became higher at − 2.7 h from − 2.5 h we found in Column 
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(2). Also, the coefficient of the female disability in the 
male’s labour supply equation became significant and posi-
tive. Therefore, husbands with disabled wives were more 
likely to spend additional time on both labour market and 
household production.
As we discussed in the previous sections, the unob-
served individual characteristics associated to labour supply 
may also be correlated with the wages and the non-labour 
income. For this reason, we applied the GMM method and 
the regressors are instrumented with variables discussed in 
the methodology section and that generally have been found 
to be correlated with both wages and non-labour income 
(Blundell et al. 1998; Devereux 2004; Donni and Moreau 
2007; Kooreman and Kapteyn 1986; Rapoport et al. 2011). 
According to Hansen’s J test statistic, we concluded that the 
excluded instruments are valid instruments and uncorrelated 
with the error term.
The interaction term of female disability and wage was 
nonsignificant in the male labour supply, and this was 
expected as we found that female disability had no impact, 
even though increases in female wage are associated with 
decline in the husbands’ labour supply, but these are rather 
low. On the other hand, we observed that the coefficient was 
positive and significant ranging between 0.45 and 0.55. This 
indicates that the labour supply declines at almost 2 h per 
day from 2.5 to 2.7 h when the disability was considered. 
The interaction of female wage and household non-labour 
income has no impact, except for the husbands and their total 
labour supply in Column (3) where the impact was found 
negative. This was expected as increases in wife’s wage, but 
also to non-labour income indicates a wealthier household 
and gives less incentive to work additional hours.
The results also confirm the assumption that women 
work more hours when they have fewer or no children, while 
higher wages reduce the effect of children on the labour sup-
ply. Thus, it is important to control for wages, not only to 
derive the sharing rules, but also to identify the effect of 
children on wife’s labour supply. Furthermore, controlling 
for wages we found also that more educated women who 
earned more are more likely to spend more hours in the 
labour market, while their partner spends more time on 
childcare and less time on labour market.
We considered the interaction terms of wage and the 
number of children, but we did not present the results as 
our main aim is to explore the sharing rules given the dis-
ability. The results showed that the higher female wage and 
Table 4  Determinants of female labour market participation
The instrument used include the following: first the employment sector (public, private or self-employed); second the geographical area, whether 
living in city, town or village; third the Gadah-district and fourth a second order polynomial for age and education for wife
Standard errors within brackets, p-values within square brackets, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, †p < 0.10
Variables Participation equation coefficients Wage equation coefficients
Female age 0.148*** (0.059) 0.023** (0.009)
Female age squared − 0.0017*** (0.0002) 2.4e-4† (1.4e-4)
Male age 0.0037† (0.0022)
Female education level (reference = no certificate)
 Female education level (primary-elementary school) 0.329*** (0.098) 0.2006 (0.1251)
 Female education level (secondary school) 0.934*** (0.102) 0.141** (0.053)
 Female education level (university degree) 2.287*** (0.103) 0.391* (0.163)
 Female education level (postgraduate studies and higher) 1.732*** (0.294) 0.905** (0.225)
Male education level (reference = no certificate)
 Male education level (primary-elementary school) 0.040 (0.096)
 Male education level (secondary school) 0.092 (0.101)
 Male education level (university degree) 0.279** (0.098)
 Male education level (postgraduate studies and higher) 0.563† (0.299)
Household non-labour income − 0.026 (0.021)
Number of children 0–5 years old − 0.081*** (0.0228) 0.085 (0.573)
Number of children 6–15 years old − 0.141*** (0.0434) 0.093 (0.107)
Female disabled − 0.244** (0.092) − 0.390** (0.159)
Urban area − 0.069 (0.079) 0.037 (0.061)
Observations 33,242
Wald Chi square statistic 574.12 [0.000]
Likelihood-ratio test 78.08 [0.000]
Likelihood-ratio test of independent equations-Rho 52.71 [0.000]
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the number of children is negatively correlated to husband’s 
labour supply, indicating that women who earn more have a 
higher degree of bargaining power and they spend less time 
on childcare.
The partial derivatives in the Panel B of Table 5 repre-
sented the change in the non-labour market income share 
that each of the partners can claim, as a function of changes 
in the spouses’ wages, the non-labour income and the dis-
tribution factor of disability. Also, we reported the results 
of the collective rationality test, which showed whether the 
collective model was preferred to the unitary model. In our 
case, we failed to reject the null hypothesis, and the col-
lective model was preferred. We found that disabled wives 
reduced their share by 1275 ID ($1.08) and increases in the 
wife’s wage led to an increase in her share by 1320 ID ($1.1).
When we considered only the labour market time, the 
wife’s sharing rule on non-labour income was nonsignifi-
cant. In the Columns (3) and (4) considering the housework 
time we observed the sharing rule of the non-labour income 
for wives became significant and a one ID increase raised 
the share by 0.43. Wives can claim 1470 ID ($1.25) and 630 
ID ($0.50) respectively with increases in their wage and the 
husbands’ wage. Disabled wives in this case reduced even 
more their share of the full income by 1310 ID ($1.11). The 
results showed that when the household domestic produc-
tion or household chores were included in the total working 
supply equations the sharing rules became larger confirming 
the assumptions of the methodological framework. The shar-
ing of disabled spouses was decreased even more, when we 
considered also the household domestic production, since 
they may have to spend time on rehabilitation activities, 
care, and resting.
Overall, we observed that the estimated coefficients of the 
disability status and spouses’ education and age confirm the 
theory of the distribution factors. More specifically, we con-
cluded that these factors strongly influenced both partners’ 
labour supplies according to the interpretation of the distri-
bution factor, and hence, the estimates support the hypoth-
esis that there are factors that may influence the household 
decisions through their impact on the intra-household alloca-
tion process. Regarding the wage effect, we showed that both 
partners work more hours when their own wages increased 
and reduced their time use in the labour market when the 
spouse’s wage increased. So far our findings are consistent 
Table 5  GMM estimates of the labour supply and domestic production Eqs. (5) and (6)
Time use on labour market and household domestic production are expressed in hours per day
Standard errors within brackets, p-values within square brackets, *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. †p < 0.10
Variables Labour supply Labour supply and domestic production
Husband Wife Husband Wife
Panel A: GMM estimates
 Log of female wage ln wf − 0.795† (0.416) 1.285* (0.564) − 0.502† (0.263) 0.624† (0.325)
 Log of male wage ln wm 3.265* (1.582) − 3.123† (1.746) 2.619* (1.231) − 2.816* (1.224)
 Interaction of spouse’ wages ln wm×ln wf 0.562* (0.255) 0.538† (0.278) 0.511† (0.265) 0.522* (0.229)
 Non-labour income (y) − 0.032* (0.015) − 0.036** (0.013) − 0.046* (0.021) − 0.036* (0.016)
 Age 0.033*** (0.008) 0.136* (0.058) 0.031* (0.015) 0.144* (0.063)
 Education 0.273 (0.188) 0.239* (0.098) 0.256 (0.182) 0.184 (0.136)
 Number of children 0–5 years old − 0.462† (0.269) − 0.950* (0.468) − 0.225† (0.121) − 0.558** (0.216)
 Number of children 6–15 years old 0.998† (0.509) − 0.262 (0.198) 1.288† (0.715) − 0.367 (0.312)
 Disabled female 1.195 (0.849) − 2.518* (1.221) 1.876* (0.885) − 2.697* (1.261)
 Disabled female × female wage 1.375 (0.927) 0.463* (0.218) 1.213 (1.009) 0.565* (0.243)
 Non-labour income (y) × female wage − 0.014 (0.010) − 0.023 (0.018) − 0.031* (0.017) − 0.049 (0.036)
 Urban area 1.653 (1.103) − 1.463 (1.145) − 0.822 (0.519) − 0.918 (0.671)
 No. observations 906 906 906 906
 Hansen’s J test statistic 6.426 [0.288] 8.954 [0.190]
∂φ/∂x ∂φ/∂x
Panel B: sharing rules for wife
 wf 1326.512* (627.02) 1483.377* (651.892)
 wm 429.872 (286.28) 628.151* (307.284)
 Non-labour income 0.370 (0.232) 0.428* (0.213)
 Disability of wives − 1275.71* (534.06) − 1308.95* (565.11)
 Collective rationality Chi square test 0.280 [0.594] 0.122 [0.741]
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with the results of earlier studies (Browning et al. 1994; 
Browning and Chiappori 1998; Bourguignon et al. 2009; 
Chiappori et al. 2002; Fortin and Lacroix 1997).
Next we present the labour supply equations for married 
couples, considering also when the wife does not participate 
in the labour market. As we mentioned in the methodology 
section, the wife’s decision to participate in the labour mar-
ket should be modelled using the reservation wages which is 
the minimum wage indicating the initial point that she will 
be willing to work (Cogan 1981). This hypothesis implies 
that the wife enjoys the same level of utility whether she par-
ticipates in the labour market or not and the husband must 
receive the same share of income whatever the wife’s deci-
sion was. The distribution of the labour market and domestic 
labour supply hours may change even when his hours of 
total work remained unaffected. The shares of the non-labour 
income ranged between 0.32 and 0.37, while in the case of 
the women who work the shares reached at 0.43. A similar 
situation was observed for increases at both spouses’ wages, 
where the share for women was lower. About our main dis-
tribution factor of interest that is the disabled women, we 
illustrated in Table 6, that the share is − 1720 ID ($1.5) 
while the respective share in the two-earner couples was 
− 1275 ID ($1.08).
Overall, the main concluding remarks so far are the fol-
lowing: First, the labour supply, household domestic produc-
tion, and the total labour supply of both spouses depend on 
the spouses’ wages. Second, the distribution factor-disabil-
ity-employed in this study is significant and has an impact 
on the spouses’ labour supply choices, suggesting that the 
collective household model is the appropriate approach for 
the two-earner couples in Iraq. This further holds when 
we include also the case of female non-participation in the 
labour market. Third, considering additionally the domestic 
production as a non-pure leisure time and as a production 
of marketable goods and services that are produced in the 
household, the share or the bargaining power of female is 
higher in terms of her wage and non-labour income.
The disability status and labour supply in Iraq presents 
similar characteristics with other countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). It is observed that due to high 
cost of treatment and care, disabilities add to social costs and 
have a negative effect not only on labour supply, but also on 
labour productivity. Most of these costs could be avoided 
Table 6  GMM estimates of the labour supply and domestic production Eqs. (5) and (6) with female non-participation
Time use on labour market and household domestic production are expressed in hours per day
Standard errors within brackets, p-values within square brackets, *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001, †p < 0.10
Variables Labour supply Labour supply and domestic production
Husband Wife Husband Wife
Panel A: GMM estimates
 Log of female rate ln wf − 0.572† (0.328) 1.398* (0.555) − 0.492* (0.232) 0.916* (0.442)
 Log of male wage ln wm 3.351* (1.571) − 3.509* (1.751) 2.729† (1.402) − 3.114* (1.544)
 Interaction of spouse’ wages ln wm×ln wf 0.426* (0.209) 0.496* (0.242) 0.436* (0.193) 0.502† (0.274)
 Non-labour income (y) − 0.046* (0.022) − 0.028* (0.013) − 0.044* (0.020) − 0.028* (0.012)
 Age 0.087* (0.042) 0.104* (0.046) 0.072† (0.037) 0.117** (0.041)
 Education 0.162 (0.124) 0.143† (0.078) 0.161† (0.084) 0.165 (0.122)
 Number of children 0–5 years old − 1.626 (1.548) − 2.126* (1.012) − 0.395† (0.206) − 1.268* (0.524)
 Number of children 6–15 years old 0.885 (1.283) − 0.985† (0.502) 1.804 (1.337) − 0.573† (0.293)
 Disabled female 1.593† (0.902) − 2.832* (1.227) 3.134*** (0.393) − 2.986* (1.458)
 Urban area 0.893 (1.102) 1.317 (0.977) − 0.2003† (0.1105) − 0.290 (0.208)
 Disabled female × female wage 1.520 (1.169) 0.411* (0.189) 1.342 (1.009) 0.627* (0.315)
 Non-labour income (y) × female wage − 0.027 (0.022) − 0.034 (0.023) − 0.033* (0.019) − 0.029 (0.025)
No. observations 33,242 33,242 33,242 33,242
 Hansen’s J test statistic 9.194 [0.418] 12.821 [0.207]
∂φ/∂x ∂φ/∂x
Panel B: sharing rules for wife
 wf 1007,179† (568.90) 1204.24* (563.18)
 wm 530.739 (514.67) 495.153† (255.98)
 Non-labour income 0.320† (0.168) 0.371* (0.159)
 Disability of wives − 1720.42† (912.85) − 1.975.25* (853.613)
 Collective rationality Chi square test 1.45 [0.117] 0.05 [0.7971]
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through mitigation mechanisms and appropriate prevention. 
Much work remains to be done to strengthen public policies 
and programs to prevent disabilities by reducing their occur-
rence and their long-term impact through early identification 
of the risk factors and introduction of preventive measures. 
Also many policies and mechanisms in MENA countries are 
missing to integrate people in the labour markets (Hakim and 
Jaganjac 2005; United Nations 2016).
However, there are major drawbacks in the empirical analy-
sis of the study. As we mentioned earlier, the main limitation 
is that the model set up and its empirical strategy relies on 
cross-sectional data ignoring the dynamic effects of spouses’ 
participation in the labour market and domestic production, 
wage, non-labour income, and health status. Therefore, a panel 
data set or repeated cross-sectional data could be very useful 
to estimate these relationships within a dynamic framework 
providing more precise and insightful estimates.
Another major limitation is the small sample of women 
participating in the labour market, which is roughly only 
2.7%. Even though the female participation in Iraq is very 
low, estimates still are likely to not be precise and robust. 
This can be overcome by including panel structure in the 
analysis, as we mentioned, and taking large-scale surveys.
Also, an important drawback of the analysis is the disabil-
ity severity which information is unavailable in the dataset 
we used. In particular, the disability registration does not 
imply that the severity is homogenous among the house-
holds. Therefore, alternative health and disability measures 
can be used, including the EQ-5D, which is a generic instru-
ment that assesses the health related quality of life (HRQoL) 
in terms of mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discom-
fort, and anxiety/depression (Brooks 1996; EuroQol Group 
1990; Rabin and de Charro 2001). This measure provides 
more information on the degree of the disability severity 
and its impact on household expenditures, disability costs, 
and labour supply.
Furthermore, the absence of panel data limits the analysis 
of investigating the disability shocks or the transition from 
healthy to disabled states and their impact on labour partici-
pation. Another point that this research has not examined is 
that children are modelled as household attributes and not as 
separate economic agents with individual utility functions. 
Even though children may not express their own preferences 
when they are young, it is reasonable to assume that the par-
ents allocate resources to maximise their children’s utility, 
especially when they are ill or disabled.
Conclusions
The study showed the definitions of the intra-household 
resource allocation considering the female non-participa-
tion in the labour market and the disability status. The 
setting and estimation of this model can be useful for 
designing and implementing efficient welfare policies 
related to the reduction of inequality and child poverty and 
the incentives of female labour supply. This is feasible if 
the intra-household resource allocation is known in terms 
of income and time use.
The findings support the assumption that changes in 
the non-labour income and distribution factors influence 
the labour supply choices and the spouses’ wages are sig-
nificant factors of bargaining power. When wife non-par-
ticipation in the labour market is considered, the results 
show that she can claim 0.37 of the non-labour income and 
increases at 0.43 when we included the household domes-
tic production. The disability has a larger effect compared 
to the two-earner couples and her share is reduced, while 
the loss becomes even larger when the household domes-
tic production is included. This may be explained by the 
fact that a sample of the wives that do not participate can 
be severely disabled and, thus, better information and 
measures about the disability status should be taken into 
consideration.
Therefore, the conclusion is that disabled women are 
placed in a more vulnerable position compared to the 
healthier women and those who are able to participate in 
the labour market. Moreover, the non-disabled people may 
have access to jobs of better quality, be more productive, 
and have higher potential earnings. Overall, disability is 
an important and crucial factor that determines and affects 
both labour market and household domestic production.
However, there are still major practical issues about 
the disability rights and policies in Iraq. The Iraqi con-
text explored in this study is a topic that has to receive a 
closer view, along with other countries in the region, as 
women and girls are imprisoned by disability and society 
norms and traditions. Disabled women are less likely to be 
employed and more likely to participate less hours in the 
labour market. Furthermore, the employment opportunities 
for persons with disabilities, and especially women, tend 
to be limited to simple projects, characterised as very few 
and mostly humiliating (United Nations 2016). The situ-
ation also appears particularly difficult for the disabled 
women, but also for children living in rural areas having 
very limited access to educational opportunities, health 
centres, and specialized services. The government should 
promote the empowerment of women with disabilities ena-
bling them to participate in all spheres of life on an equal 
basis with others, and especially an active participation in 
the labour market.
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